MOTTO
– WHITHER INDIA
FOREIGN
POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA IN THE NINETIES
1. Every sovereign country has some core values and interests. The national policies of a country, we can surmise, would be tailored to secure these core values and interests and indeed, the foreign policy, which is but a constituent of the overall national policy, is also designed to achieve the same aim.
2. Although core values and interests are permanent, the national policy that a country adopts is set within certain major premises. Any change, therefore in the major premises automatically indicates a review of minor premises and policy options based on them. The turbulence in the geopolitical arena witnessed in the latter half of the eighties has comprehensively and irreversibly changed almost all the fundamental parameters and we now have a whole new ball game! It is an unedifying spectacle for any nation to become a diplomatic enuch and remain somnolent and moribund, despite momentous changes all round the world. It is clearly indicative of a bankruptcy of geopolitical, diplomatic and intellectual skills. Worse still, is to make diplomatic gaffes of the type of we saw during the Gulf crisis based on facile assumptions and poor advise.
3. The nineties are due to witness a readjustment of various power alignments and it is an imperative for us to review our foreign policy so that our stature is regained and maintained intact and in fact.
India’s
Post Independence Foreign Policy
4. India emerged on 15th August, 1947, to a new freedom and was hailed as a success story. The Mahatma’s non-violent credo caught the world’s fancy and with a visionary Nehru at the helm, India was at the forefront of a new movement called the Non-Alignment Movement [NAM]. The choice available to India was either to become a client or satellite of one or the other bloc or chart its own route. As the decolonisation process triggered by India’s independence and the limp post-war economies of colonial powers proceeded apace, the bulk of Afro Asian nation-states joined the NAM which in the sixties and seventies became a potent force with a majority in the UN General Assembly and was recognized as such. The purely centrist path adopted by the movement was something which was not comprehensible to US thinkers and policy makers who thought of it as at best a puzzle and at worst a nuisance and the western media often dubbed it as a bunch of fence sitters, who with their clever manipulation of one bloc against another was taking advantage of both. It was perhaps beyond their ken to comprehend that the newly independent ex-colonies of Africa, Asia and Latin America found it a psychological necessity to assert their independence of choice on foreign policy issues not as members of one or other bloc but as sovereign entities. It was therefore, often that the countries of the NAM made choices which were not in accord with each other, making the NAM less cohesive. The consensus approach to decision-making adopted by the NAM was a direct result of this phenomenon.
1970-1985
5.
One of the characteristics of a dynamic system is hiccups. The NAM had its first one after the Six-Day
War in 1967 despite having been strengthened by the solidarity displayed in
backing Egypt in the 1956 Seuz crises. Others
soon followed in the guise of our own Friendship Treaty with the USSR and
the various directions countries of West Asia took following the Yom Kippur
war and Camp David. India the primogenitor
of the movement, was viewed as having a shade of pink its lily white apron.
The pure whiteness had commenced tarnishing after the demise of Pandit
Nehru, who had an image of high morals, an image which could not be matched
by his daughter. The nails in the moral coffin came all too
soon with the Emergency, and more latterly, Bofors, HDW et. Al., By 1985, the world over, India’s feet of clay
were seen and any moralizing on principals was considered as sanctimonious,
hypocritical and out of syne with the countries current stature in such matters;
and therefore ignored. The NAM’s [and
India’s] ability to influence world opinion was at its nadir by the late eighties.
In the new dispensation, after the Russian about face, most policy
makers and advisors to world governments believe that the ideological philosophical
and real-politic basis of the non-aligned movement has vanished. The husk that remains, they maintain, is no longer relevant. What they want to know is how is India going
to deal with the new realities of the post-Cold War, post Gulf War era.
6. The social sciences has various disciplines, the major among which are economics, sociology and political science. Each of these attempts to identify and solve problems of the world community in economic, sociological or political terms. In the increasing complexity of the modern world however, problems can rarely be identified as distinctly economic, social or political [forgetting for a moment the historical lineage of some of them]. It is therefore necessary to have a more holistic approach and Wallerstien [1974], has suggested a return to the pre-social science concept of political economy. The emphasis in this approach is to overcome the most basic divergence in the study of human society, that between social sciences and history. A brief look at the world that has emerged since 1985, and the likely power equations and the basis of these equations is called for at this juncture.
7.
It is a cliché to state that “no man is an island” but true nonetheless,
not only for an individual but also countries.
A study of a country or state by modern social science is likely to
the inconclusive since the system in the country, unless it is a self-contained
one, cannot be adequately understood. Wallerstien
[1980] has therefore looked at a more complete object called an “entity” defined
by their modes of production. At its lowest order is the mini system characterized by hunting
or rudimentary agricultural and reciprocal exchange between producers. Most such systems have perished in a few generations.
8.
The other two entities which have emerged are, on the one hand, world-empires
which are characterized by a large agricultural class producing surplus, allowing
development of some specialized non-agricultural skills and a third and controlling
“administrator” or ruling military-bureaucratic class. On the second hand, is the entity called the
world economy with a capitalist mode of production wherein the basic drive
of the system is accumulation of the surplus as capital and criteria for production
is exchange and profitability. The
world empire is politically controlled and completion eliminated and the world
economy is controlled by the cold hand of the market, wherein the efficient
prosper and the less efficient perish. World economies are extremely fragile and were subjugated by world
empires till the fifteenth/sixteenth century when the European world economy
emerged and survived. Having survived
the world economy expanded to become truly global by 1900.
9.
Basic Elements: There
are three basic elements identified [Wallerstein] in the world economy viz.:
[a] The Single World Market:
In brief, a capitalist market where market forces dictate production
levels, value of commodities and therefore the type and location of production.
It is expletive and a concrete result is uneven economic development
across the world. Since World War
II the world market has been dominated by multi-national corporations.
[b] The Multiple State
System: There are a number
of political states in the world economy and these are a necessary element
to ensure that one state does not control the whole market. Nevertheless single states, depending on their
economic power can distort the market for a short time in the interest of
their national capitalist groups. This
is the very stuff of international politics and generates various balance
of power situations. Hitherto, since
the Second World War, the balance of power has been bi-polar.
[c] The Three-Tier Structure: Wallerstien argues that the expletive process
of the world economy always works in a three-tier format [being more stable
than a two-tier one]. This element
is also therefore necessary and is also political in nature, but in a more
subtle way than the previous one. These
at the top will always manocuvre to create a three-tier structure and those at the bottom will emphasize
the two-tiers of “them and us”. The
obvious examples are centrist parties between the right and loft in political
systems or in a general case the notion of a middle class between capital
and labour or more interestingly Wallerstien’s concept of a semi-periphery
which separates the core of material well-being and the exploited periphery
of poorer states.
The Concepts of Core
and Periphery and Worlds
10.
[b] Core and Periphery: The concept of peripheralization meant the
new areas joined the world economy on unfavourable terms or on the periphery
as opposed to the core [meaning the rich countries]. In world economy, the terms core and periphery do not connote areas
or regions but processes which operate in the two distinct parts of the system.
In simplest terms core processes consist of relations that incorporate
relatively high wages, advanced technology and a diversified production mix
whereas periphery processes involve low wages, rudimentary technology and
a simple production mix. In the modern world it is common place to refer
to the core as consisting of the rich countries i.e., Europe, Japan and USA
and periphery meaning the poor countries of the Third World. By implication the core is exploitive and the
periphery-exploited.
[c] The Semi-Periphery: One of the original elements of Wallerstien’s
approach is the definition of that part of the system where there is a mix
of both the processes – the semi-periphery. This is an interesting and dynamic category of the world economy
through which, in the restructuring of the economy, zones rise and sink. The success of a semi-periphery zone working
to evolving to the core depends on the political processes. By implication a semi-peripheral zone is exploited
by the core and exploit the periphery.
[d] Geostrategic and
Geopolitical Regions: In the
only complete revision of the Heart land – Rim land thesis enunciated by Mackindez
and Spykman, Cohen [Geography and Politics in a World Divided, Cohen, 1975] defines two geostrategic areas
of Trade Dependant USA and the Eurasian continent. In addition, South Asia is recognized as a
potential geostrategic area. He has
also defined three geopolitical regions which have developed into new world
powers is Japan, China and Europe to join USA and USSR. Other geopolitcal region have, he says, developed
second order powers which dominate their region, such as India, Brazil and
Nigeria. Cohen assesses twenty-seven
states to be second order powers and beyond these defines third, forth and
fifty order states.
11.
Relative Power of States: The measurement of power of states is always
a problem. A simple method is the
Puck’s Index where the cube of the GNP is multiplied by the square root of
the population [Muir 1981]. This is not satisfactory when put alongside
the defeat of a super power USA by a medium power Vietnam or the defeat of
medium power Britain by small power Iceland in the Cold War in 1970 or its
victory over medium power Argentina in 1982.
We can, of course, resort to “rough estimates” depending on the “situation”
in which power is employed. Here too,
some variables are used but the exercise is subjective. A completely fresh approach to studying state
power is against the system of world economy and using the concept of covert
and overt power relations.
12.
Actual and Latent Force: The distinction between the actual or overt
and latent or covert force and its use is well known. Overt power of a state however, need not result in the actual use
of force, which will be always the last resort. Latest or covert power in various forms is much more, the preferred
way. Bleachman and Kaplan [1978] record
215 incidents between 1945 and 1976 when American armed forces were used politically
to farther US interests. Similar gun
beat diplomacy has been used by the USSR in 190 incidents [Kaplan 1981] in approximately the same
time span [1944-1979].
13.
The most well known form a covert power is a term which Sahattschneider
[1960] calls “non-decision making”. He
means, by this, that in any politics only some conflicts of interest will
be represented on the political agenda. All
other conflicts will be “organized cut of politics” so that they do not become
the subjects of any overt power relations. For instance a most sustained attempt to change the agenda of world
politics occurred at the UN after the Third World achieved majority in the
General Assembly. The UNCTAD has spanned
two “development decades” and the Bandt Commission engendered the Cancun Conference
in which “Global Negotiations” took place. Cancun was the most well organized forum yet,
which paid lip service to development of poorer countries but the agenda of
world politics has still not changed. This
was because it was not North-South issues which dominated current inter-state
relations but the East-West conflict. The lesson is simple – once established, agendas are very difficult
to shift since they represent the very assumptions on which politics is based.
This is non-decision making as it leaves the status quo untouched by
the mainstream of world politics. It is important to understand that power games
are not played out in some neutral arena. Getting an issue on the agenda is a start, but it is only the beginning.
When the UN put pressure after the Cancun Conference on the dominant
states – notable the USA – it only weakened that body in their eyes.
The East-West conflict having virtually vanished, the UN, if indeed,
now succeeds in focusing attention on third world poverty, there is no guarantee
that material in-equalities will be tackled successfully.
The vested interests of the status quo will have to combat the periphery
directly but they need not have o use overt force to maintain their position.
14.
The most important form of power relation is the structural position
in the world economy. If we consider
two states [Taylor 1985] Brazil and Switzerland; on
almost every power index Brazil will appear more powerful, but in the hierarchical
spatial structure of the world economy, Switzerland is the core and Brazil
the semi-periphery and thus exploited. How does it do so? Swiss
bankers are part of the core banking community which imposes conditionalities
on debtor countries. Operations of
the market ensure that Swiss multinationals facilitate the flow of surplus
from Brazil to their own country and thus ensure Swiss predominance. The Swiss do not have to engage in any overt
use of power or covert power in agenda setting to attain this dominance. The structure of the world economy is such
as to favour Switzerland at Brazil’s expense if they engage in normal trading
relations. In other words with more
efficient production they can call the tune in countries that cannot directly
compete economically with them.
15.
Power and Appearance: In the world
economy approach, Taylor [1985] says, power is a direct reflection of the
ability of the state to operate within the system to its own material advantage,
and depends on the efficiency of its production processes which we have measured
by our categories of core, periphery and semi-periphery. Generally speaking there is a tendency for
core states to be relatively liberal in their characteristics since their
power is based primarily on economic prowess.
In contrast, the semi-periphery tends to be occupied by authoritarian
states which appear to be politically powerful. Russia illustrated this characteristic whilst India was an exception.
The political postures of such authoritarian semi-peripheral states
can be seen to compensate for their relative economic weakness.
In the periphery economic dependence remains even if political independence
has been achieved, leading to concepts such as “informal imperialism” and
“neo-colonialism”, whereby the destiny of the country remains almost wholly
outside its own control. Their main
problem is internal security leading to repression and despite tanks and guns
they are essentially weak states.
16.
Wallerstion’s three-tier structure of core, periphery and semi-periphery
is a horizontal one. The world economy
does not operate on this global scale alone.
It is a holistic concept and we can assume that it also relates to
the national state and much lower at a more local level.
We can conceive a vertical three tier structures wherein the nation
state becomes the mediator between global and local scales. Thus at the local scale where we live our daily
lives it is one of experience. At
the national scale it represents ideology and since nation states cannot be
isolated from realities in the world, at the global scale it represents reality.
By “reality” we mean the level at which the operation of the world
economy “really matters”. In the materialistic sense, accumulation which
is the motor of the whole system operates through the world market at a global
scale. In contrast ideology at a national
scale is a partial view and liable to distort the reality due to being nation-centered
resulting in conflicting world views. This nation-centered thinking has become pervasive in modern politics
and has to be guarded against or confronted, as you will.
17.
Our Core Values and National Interests: To recap the preamble of this essay, we assumed
that the national interests of a nation [being permanent] rest on the bedrock
of the core values adopted by that nation. What if any are India’s core values. Perhaps they are somewhat like this:
[a] We want to be sovereign in all respects;
[b] We want to be secular;
[c] We want democracy to flourish in our country;
[d] We want to live in peace and amity both with our neighbours
and with the rest of the world community, based on our principle of non-violence.
[e] We would also want to be a party in promoting peace and
amity in the world community.
18.
Given
the above our national interests would be to:
[a] To secure our borders. To do so we need to resolve any ambiguities
and conflict situations that exist.
[b] Step up our economic growth so that we rise from the status of a periphery/semi-periphery state to a core state, thus achieving economic sovereignty. [As has been stated earlier, core states have a tendency to be more liberal and thus achieving economic sovereignty will assist the generation of secular ideas in our country].
[c] Take initiatives to further dialogue on
all bilateral issues with our neighbours with an open mind and positive attitude.
[This will become easier as our attitudes liberalize].
19.
Foreign Policy Thrusts: Having developed the outlines and operative
mechanism of the world system and enumerated our core values and national
interests, it remains for us to mesh one with the other and evolve further
our foreign policy thrusts. It is
worth stating here that the fundamental thrust would necessarily have to be
tailored to facilitate India’s rise from the semi-peripheral to the core region. This in fact, is the “Grand Aim” of our foreign
policy. Now let us examine how this
Aim appears in its constituent parts viz. India'’ dealings with the world
community, which consists of countries at all levels of the three tier structure.
In the present post Gulf War dispensation, it is evident that the US
is a military super power though not an economic one.
The USSR retains its military super power status but is and economic
pygmy and the economic giants have no military power.
20.
How than is poor India to behave – Do we believe in the policy of a
friend’s friend is also our friend and vice-versa or adopt the Chanakya –
Niti; wherein your neighbour is your enemy but his neighbour your friend till
you devour your neighbour and review the whole thing ab initio. What is amply clear is that old idioms can’t be flogged any longer.
The post World War II situation was far clearer then is the scenario
today. Then it was sufficient to choose
some development model [which we did], stick together with others of your
ilk and tread a delicate path between the power blocs [which we did upto a
point]. It was certainly not simple
but hardly us tough an exercise, where we will have to chart a diplomatic
course in today’s world, which is in a state of flux.
We need to do some hard thinking in South Block and the man during
there have to shake of the inertia to develop fresh approaches.
Merely to talk of strengthening NAM and strengthening SAARC will probably
be enough.
21.
India and the G7: It is on the cards that in the foreseeable
future after the European Union in 1992 it will be a major economic power-center
along with Japan. The US however has
emerged as the dominant power and on all issues critical to it is likely to
call the tune. We will simply have
to learn to deal with the Americans and by extension the Europeans and Japanese.
We will have to do so because it is these nations who will facilitate
our rise from the semi-periphery to the core by suitable and graduated technology
transfer and assimilation. But to deal with the G7 we will first have
to make them receptive to our overtures.
22.
India and the US:
[a] The US today has its own problems. The end of the cold war and the management of its relations with
the eastern bloc particularly the Soviets; ensuring that the Middle East put
doesn’t boil over; working out its economic and trade relations with Japan
and the soon to be amalgamated. Europe,
including of course, the United Germany; management of its internal recession;
looking after its geopolitical and economic interests in the Pacific rim and
its security concerns relevant especially to the US Centoom and the functioning
of the post Warsaw-Pact NATO. If South
Asia is therefore on the back burner, it should come as no surprise.
[b] In the emerging world order we will have to willy milly accept
that the US is the world’s only fully functioning super power and the only
likely source of rewards. Yet, the
fact is that all roads do not lead to Washington. We will have to calculate not only the cost of saying No to Washington
but also how it might profit us to say Yes. The US sees no reason to go out of its way
to pamper a nation whose UN voting record has caused it many a anxious moments.
Pax Americana or not, many US legislators consider this the right moment
to twist India’s arm to drive home the point that this country can no longer
negotiate or bargains from its high pedestal of moral or spiritual strength.
Super and Special 301 the bid to mete but the Presslax Amendment treatment
to India show just that. Americans
however, do point out that during the eighties they had learnt to appreciate
India as a regional power factor, a practicing democracy and a potential friend
but are mystified at India’s lack of comprehension of the staggering changes
which have come upon the world with such breath-taking speed.
American experts would want to know clearly how India proposes to deal
with the new post cold war and post Gulf War realities.
They believe that as a mature nation we cannot afford to forget that
economics often defines the limits of geopolitics and diplomacy.
Of late the US has shown a supportive attitude towards Indians stand
on Kashmir and are somewhat surprised and a little hurt that India has not
expressed appreciation of the US’s support towards our recent borrowings from
the IMF.
[c] What should India’s diplomatic initiatives be vis-à-vis the
US. First must come to the realization
that the atmosphere is ripe for improvement of Indo-US relations, because
the bureaucratic consensus to do so is enternded on both sides. This was amply evident during the Indo-US Symposium
held in Pune during the December 1990. The
other parameter is to see that all initiatives are tailored to achieve our
Grand Aim of economic resurgence and secure our national interests, stated
earlier. We must convey to the US
that it is in America’s overall strategic interest to see that India grows
faster economically, being the only means of pulling up other Third World
powers. The US must also be more determined
in encouraging its allies to give India more, as a reward for its moderation,
responsibility and consistently non-aggressive stance. And the last but not the least, the US should
show faith by checking Pakistan’s destabilizing efforts in Kashmir and Punjab
and use its clout with the financial institution and the UN to our advantage.
[d] It, of course, will be the spitting to windward, if our foreign
policy experts attempt to talk the US into accepting all that has been stated
above. India on its part requires
to review our earlier stance on various issues and identity areas where we
can change tack without capitulating or loosing our self-respect. A pre-requisite for this exercise is a pragmatic
and hard-boiled approach and attitude. Some areas worthy of review can be readily addressed.
i] In the post Gulf War scenario several
Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have developed a distance
towards the Palestinian issue and it no longer enjoys a resonance in the Gulf/Arab
World as in the past. Consequent to
the Baker initiative for a Middle East Peace Conference it would appear that
practically all Arab countries and Israel will get on the bandwagon.
India could conveniently make a big symbolic change in its foreign
policy by giving its relationship with Israel a diplomatic face.
We have, often blindly, supported the Arab nations for conveying our
solidarity for the Palestinian cause and to ensure support for our stand in
Kashmir in international fora. None
of these reasons now appear to make sense.
ii] The NPT is another contentious issue where
a review is possible. It is worth
recalling that after the failure of the 1946 Baruch Plan, India helped to
prepare and draft the IAEA charter in the 1957 conference. One of the catalysts for the NPT of 1978 was
our own Pokhran test of 1974. Our
consistent stand that it is discriminatory is valid and is proved by the number
of nations including France which are non-signatory nations. Yet, there are some areas of agreement viz.,
both India and US are interested in stability, peaceful resolution of international
problems, economic co-operation and a restraint on the export of advanced
weaponry. Additionally the US is India's
single largest trading partner and both have convergent views on the use the
UN for peace-keeping activities. There
is
iii] Another area where India and the US could
follow parallel policies informally is nuclear safety as both undoubtedly
agree about the importance of safe operation of nuclear reactors. Post-Cherncbyl, the US Department of Energy
commissioned a study from publicly available information to identify all reactors
where there may be nuclear safety concerns. The study identified 22 reactors world wide with weak performance
records of which seven are in South Asia.
This area thus presents itself to us, wherein Indo-US joint efforts
could be nurtured.
iv] The recent efforts by India to liberalize
the economic regions would, it is hoped, change it from a controlled and non-competitive
one to core world economy statis with the generation of competition.
The need to review our own Intents law and controls to protect Intellectual
Property Rights [IPR] would become a necessity.
The sticking point in Indo-US relations with regard to IPR protection
can thus be resolved.
India
and Europe/Japan In economic affairs, Europe
[specifically Germany] and Japan are centers of power and they do not acknowledge
US economic leadership. The recent
spate of American Universities offering Japanese language courses and the
demand for them is an indicator of the influence of economic power outside
ones own borders. There is a broad
convergence between the US and other G7 nations on the necessity to put pressure
on India in the form of conditionalities in economic relations, linking economic
issues with human rights, reduced defense expenditure and limits on Indian
missile and nuclear activities. With the easing of bureaucratic controls on our economy our diplomatic
thrust should be in the shape of hard-boiled businessmen enticing richer nations
to our market for our own profit. In the context of technology transfers close ties will be useful
and India can provide the attractive market being sought by the G7. Making head way with America will automatically
change the tone of the India-G7 relationship.
24.
India and the Gulf/Arab Nations: Gulf crisis and the way it was managed showed
that both American military and diplomatic policy were successful. This means that US military intervention in
the Gulf is now accepted. It is also
conceivable that local crises will be engineered to justify intervention. In the scenario which unfolds India requires
to drop the crutches of the Palestinian cause as mentioned earlier. We need to also remove from ourselves the pressure
to make a statement/take a stand on all issues. The studied detachment of China and the Soviet
Union in the Gulf crisis was certainly better than our pathetic display of
pretending that we had a role to play [a la peace mission] or worse having
our Foreign Minister embrace Saddam in occupied Kuwait.
25.
India and ASEAN: With the economy in doldrums, India has long
since lost out to the ASEAN countries, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan as
the development model for the Third World.
Thus our foreign policy thrust should be singular with these nations.
Any move which will assist in raising us from the semi-periphery to
the core could be adopted. This is largely tied up to the generation of
competition in our economy and an enhancement of our product quality. Given our inherently cheap labour, we will
be then able to do business with these countries as equals.
26.
India and the Soviet Bloc: Consequent to the dismantling of the Communist
system the republics of the Soviet Union and the erstwhile satellite states
are facing severe economic recession and are trying to get used to democratic
freedom as a way of life. With regard
to the political system in all these countries it is predictable that they
will settle into a democratic system very akin to India, as to follow the
US model initially with the economic weakness prevalent would build intolerable
pressures within the society. We must recognize that being part of the semi-periphery together,
India and USSR [inclusive it seceding republics] have much in common. The answers that the East Bloc countries needs
on how transit to a practicing democracy are available with us. Economically too; the results and inferences
of our experiments will be valuable to enable these countries to develop a
new developmental model and we should be able to expand our interaction for
our mutual benefit. In reality, all
these countries are markets for our consumer products industry to exploit
and if so far our diplomatic pundits have not moved to consolidate our position
therein, it is to our loss.
27.
India
and Neighbouring Countries:
i] In the regional area, we need to take a hard look at our past relations with our neighbours. Our very size is a source of concern to them, barring China. While nothing can be done about that, we must ensure that the concern does not degenerate into a numb, pervasive hostility. Just as the core nations view us as a market, we must similarly, view our neighbours as a market waiting to be tapped. Access to it will depend solely on our diplomatic efforts to assuage any apprehensions and economic efforts to upgrade our products. It is scandalous, for instance that India has not respected its side of the Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Teen Bigha dispute. Other areas of friction also need to be net head on and resolved mutually. Similarly, our controversial role in Sri Lanka’s ethnic strife needs to be put firmly behind us. We should reach out to those elements in Sri Lanka who are not so obdurate about giving autonomy to the Tamil minority and hear their voices and lend them tacit support. Nepal’s susceptibilities too, need to be taken into account. That country, it is obvious, resents our pressure tactics as much as it scorns our self-serving references to the commonality of our cultures.
ii] Likewise there is much that can be done to resolve our border dispute with China. It is evident that China is not helping ease Indian fears of a China-Pakistan nexus, by supplying long range missiles to Pakistan. This contravenes the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and has caused a misalignment in Sion-US relations, an indication of which is the withholding of the MHF status from China. The lack of progress on human rights is also a rough edge in Sion-US relations. A greater willingness on our part to seek an early solution to the Sino-Indian boarder problem even if it is in terms not entirely in consonance with our publicly voice positions would enable expeditious resolution and more fruitful and advantageous co-operation with that country. We could use the American card to gain for ourselves the best bargain for ourselves as our first moves vis-à-vis the US start bearing fruit.
iii] Pakistan is admittedly a more difficult problem. Primarily that country knows that it will stay intact provided it nurtures the two-nation theory. Thus it has perforce to keep Kashmir at a boil and dabble in Punjab. It also is revengeful regarding the creation of Bangladesh. All the same Nawaz Sharif is a practical man and open to American persuasion. Recent reports that some BCI accounts were used to finance Pakistan’s nuclear programme and the arrest last month of Brig. Inam-ul-Hag in Frankfurt for attempting to smuggle nuclear weapons components can be used to advantage by India in bringing US pressure to bear to control Pak activities in Kashmir and Punjab. We to can do a great deal to establish our bonafides in the eyes of Pakistani public opinion. Bold steps to facilitate travel and trade will allow our economic influence to spread, swift moves to reach agreement in Siachen, a genuine dialogue to curb defense expenditure and nuclear arms proliferation will all go a long way.
Conclusion
28. As long as India has a begging bowl in its hands the limits of our diplomatic options are narrow. But the first steps have been taken to remedy that. As we move economically forward our foreign policy much keep pace. Many US scholars have expressed surprise that we in our present depressive mood, fail to realize the basic strengths of our economy. The current balance of payments difficulties, they say, must not make us obvious to the essential soundness of the economy. America and the G7 see India’s economic crisis as a short term one. The recognize that the Indian economy is structurally stronger than a decade or two ago and appreciate the trend towards economic liberalization. We have to now follow up the recently announced policy changes with a dismantling of bureaucratic machinery and the way will be clear for us to rise through the semi-periphery to the core of world economy.
29. With our neighbours, concessions and compromises need not be tantamount to capitulation just as a pragmatic approach in our relations with the core nations need not be considered as an abdication of our sovereignty. We will need to draw our pride as a nation not from the size of our military muscle and even less from our ability to draft lofty resolutions in international for a, but from the health of our economy, the well being of our people, the stability of our political system and not the least from our pluralistic and rich culture. Just as individualism is the guiding spirit in human endeavour; today, nations too need to think for themselves rather than hope for collective action on a global scale. Our diplomatic corps will require to rely less on hunches and facile assumptions and learn to study in depth and carry out a “military style appreciation” of each situation, keeping the “Grand Aim” in mind. Thereafter if it is indicated that we need to change tack or even turn about than they have to be confident enough to implement the plan. They will also require to retain the sensitivity to monitor and comprehend the global changes and the flexibility to readjust to them.
30. Above all we should as a people do our utmost to see that the New Industrial Policy does not flounder because of the stranglehold of an alliance of politicians with the old faith in socialism and public sector to cure Indian poverty; bureaucrats who like levers of power over economic affairs and big business which lack the capacity and will to compete in the open market.
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